Set up, under the aegis of the IAEA, bankable assurances of enriched uranium supply, and reprocessing services for any country with a good civil nuclear programme.

Unhinge the deadlock preventing agreement on a comprehensive convention against terrorism.

Focus on more resources and imagination in regions where it has an important, but so far under developed role. For this, governments will need to be honest and realistic with issues that are beyond their capacity to master.

Avoid neglect and be involved, an absence of which is highlighted by recent events in Gaza and Lebanon.

Avoid unilateral imposition of solutions.

Lord Hannay felt that, with a stronger mandate and greater resources through UNIFIL in Lebanon, and close cooperation with the EU, the UN could play a bigger role in the Middle East. So far, he talked about effectiveness, and the issue of coherence was being addressed by the High Level Panel. What must be ensured is that the UN field agencies work effectively to a single set of overall goals in a way that avoids duplications and contradictions.

Lord Hannay closed by identifying 2 characteristics in the UN, without which the world will suffer. With a lack of will and determination, the United Nations will be associated with indispensability and ineffectiveness. The bleak consequences should be a serious driving force for achieving greater effectiveness.

Simon Maxwell reminded us that this was a debate, and that his argument was simply that the United Nations had not worked in the past, and that, in all likelihood, it would not work in the future. He admitted that there have been successes, for example in dealing with famine and vaccinations.

However, in a general sense, the UN had fallen short of its aspirations. 1 billion people were living on less than $1 a day. People were dying due to the failure of UN intervention, and the issue was further complicated by the fact that the UN has had to balance the interests of the West and those of China.

Maxwell’s main focus was on the development side. He quoted many statistics to support his view. In Vietnam, there were 11 UN agencies, which received only 2% of the total aid that was earmarked for Vietnam. There were a total of 60 global health funds, and all of them were trying to deliver aid and core services. There was a reduction in aid, as aid donors began to cherry-pick certain elements of aid programmes, rather than the whole package. On top of that, 75% of the aid came in dribs and drabs.

All of these unfortunate statistics were symptomatic of the legacy of the historical and political context that has defined the United Nations. In the 1950s, there was a struggle between the World Bank and the United Nations over which organisation should control aid. This series of interplay between these 2 entities has shaped the way in which aid works today.

Maxwell then moved on to asking a few questions, namely:

What is it that we want?

How do we achieve this?

Why is this change so difficult to achieve?

The answer to the first was that we wanted a coherent, self confident and international United Nations. The answer as to ‘how’ could be answered through an insight into the workings of the World Bank, and a thorough comparison with the UN. And finally, any good project, if deemed undesirable by the US due to its competitive threat, would always be stopped. Therefore, any meaningful change would be difficult because it would require collective action through coalitions similar to those found amongst villagers, office workers, business people and fish (when there is a common threat like a shark). In these groupings, there is a strong sense of social pressure, a sense of what is acceptable and what is not, exemplified by simple issues like dealing with commodities such as tea bags in an office, where colleagues do not steal tea bags due to the collective pressure. Coupled to this social pressure, a level of trust will need to exist between all the parties involved. The USA has said no to Kyoto and to the Convention on the Rights of Children. They flaunt the UN and get away with it, because they are not penalised for their attitude. This type of behaviour would not be acceptable in our societies and communities due to the aforementioned social pressure. Although this pressure cannot be imposed upon sovereign states because of their national interests, especially if they are a Superpower with no equal, there can be incentives.

Maxwell ended his speech by concluding that if all the countries united against bilateralism and demanded multilateralism, then this would create a social pressure amongst countries, and this would affect and result in change.

There were 2 rounds of relevant questions. What message was the UN sending out to developing countries, when it was incapable of dealing with human rights abuses in the developed countries? What about the Arab states? How could social pressure be put on the US? What were the key objectives of the UN? How effective was the management of human resources and recruitment of skilled professionals within the UN? Is there a distinction between what is wrong with the UN and its members, and what is wrong with its bureaucracy?

The bulk of the questions were answered by Lord Hannay. He said that the Arab countries were participating in the UN and some progress was being made. The key objectives were enshrined in the UN charter to which was appended the Universal Human Rights. A few of the key concepts revolved around peace, security, independence for the colonies, prosperity and human rights. The UN was a big improvement on the League of Nations, where the big powers failed to participate and which the USA never actually joined. These big powers were indispensable to the UN, and as much as the UN needed the USA, the USA in turn needed it. With this set up, there is always a role for persuasion to achieve the key objectives.

Simon Maxwell formulated an answer regarding the question of how to initiate and achieve this change. He indicated stages: building trust between Europe and the USA, and cooperating with dialogue and presenting an effective case enthused with a charismatic leadership. We should form alliances and take the debate forward. And finally, to find precedents which contain evidence of benefits that have been offered in the past, and to develop from these a potent array of further incentives.

October 18th, 2006
Does Aid Work?

Monica Ali, the acclaimed novelist and broadcaster, chaired a stimulating debate on the efficacy of aid.
The speakers were Will Day, a consultant to the United Nations Development Programme, Dr Kurt Hoffman, Director of the Shell Foundation, and Dr Richard Kozul-Wright, a senior economist at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

Will Day began his defence of aid by disclaiming bad aid, by which inappropriate or useless gifts gave spiritual or political gratification to the donor while being of no benefit to the needy. The opposite of poverty is not charity but prosperity, charity being a means, alongside governments and markets, for enabling people to achieve their potential. He identified three main roles for charity. Humanitarian aid in the event of disasters that overwhelm the local capacity to respond and where cash was often a more useful tool to help people rebuild their lives; global campaigns such as the eradication of small pox and hopefully polio; and charities aimed at redressing geographic or institutional disadvantages.

As regards geography, he identified three categories of country that required different responses. Those with natural resources that could, at least in principle, be exploited for the benefit of the whole population rather than a narrow elite. Those with a coastline that allows easy access to international markets. And thirdly, those countries with neither resources nor ports and which lacked the fundamental building blocks for development. Among the institutional challenges, Day said that markets often failed to supply diverse needs from water to banking, with poor people considered to risky or unprofitable. In fact, he said, poor people were more reliable re-payers of debt than the better off, and among the poor women are the most reliable of all. Weak media also make it hard to achieve conditions of accountability, while local and national governments often lack the revenue base from which to raise taxes and fund services. Both governments and investors have short time horizons that leave them incapable of addressing long-term issues such as climate change. And where economic growth is achieved, it is all too often at the expense of rising inequality and environmental degradation. Whereas some cities like Johannesburg can issue bonds, no one will buy bonds from Mogadishu, even it the authorities had the capacity to issue them. Yet India will have to find place in its cities for another 300 million citizens, with all the constraints on water and other resources that go with it. Strong growth will help, but the response should be a hybrid of both markets and aid. As well as a moral imperative, there are strong arguments of self-interest in favour of aid.

Dr Kurt Hoffman focused on the role of aid in stimulating economic growth. Pressure, in part from the Make Poverty History campaign, is leading to a sharp rise in aid, from $58bn in 2004, to $80bn in 2005 and in excess of $100bn in 2006. The issue now is not how much, but how it is spent, with an estimated $200bn already held by multilateral agencies that face capacity issues regarding their appropriate disbursement. Since 1950, aid flows have failed to generate growth. In the last three decades of the millennium, aid to Sub-Saharan Africa rose from 4% of GDP to 20%, yet the African economy contracted. Moreover, a study of twenty-two Sub-Saharan countries that received $530bn in aid over the period revealed no evidence that spending on education and infrastructure had resulted in any productivity gains. Turning public money into services for the world’s poor had some success stories but many more failures. Between 30% and 70% of health aid does not reach the poor, and before more aid can be justified, past failures should be examined. Make Poverty History’s idea of report cards to enhance accountability should be extended to the aid community, with only about 20% of aid flows currently subject to any form of independent evaluation. Such behaviour in the corporate world would be considered criminal. Instead, aid recipients should have a choice of suppliers, and agencies and NGOs that failed should go out of business – something that happens only very rarely. There should be peer reviews and independent league tables to identify successes, making the aid community more accountable.

Dr Kozul-Wright's notes>>

Dr Richard Kozul-Wright said that Sub-Saharan Africa was a continent in crisis, with real incomes unchanged over the last thirty years, 300 million people living on less than a dollar a day, rising to an expected 400 million by 2015 if policies remain unchanged. Over the last generation, life expectancy has fallen from 55 to 46 years, and many countries are dependent on food aid. The G8’s target to double the African economy by 2015 is, a year in, is already off-track, and whilst welcoming the commitment to double aid by 2010, Africa must generate its own resources to combat poverty. Some claim that aid undermines markets and is often misused, although corruption should be seen as an effect, as well as a cause, of underdevelopment. Africa has long been open to international markets, with many countries disproportionately dependent on one or two commodity exports that left them vulnerable to external shocks. In the early 1980s, a combination of higher interest rates and debt repayments, the sharp rise in the oil price, and low prices for other commodities resulted in the debt crisis. The austerity demanded by the IMF and World Bank in exchange for debt rescheduling – ‘stabilise, liberalise and privatise’ – had the most damaging effect on the African economy. Had Africa performed as well in the last twenty-five years as it had in the 1960s and 1970s, it would have generated $3 trillion of extra resources.

Kozul-Wright argued that aid has worked in terms of humanitarian relief, but not in terms of development and growth. Those calling for a ‘Marshall Plan for Africa’ should recognise that it is about more than just money. The Marshall Plan to Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War allowed a realistic timetable and offered a coherent, strategic vision of what was politically viable. It recognised that some prescriptions were either painful or needed time to work, and allowed recipient countries to determine spending priorities under a system of peer review. In contrast, current aid ignored these principles, focusing instead on donor-driven projects and conditionality. He argued for a new consensus about the strengthening of infrastructure, arguing the public investment does not crowd out private investment but instead pulls it in. There is a renewed focus on the delivery of global public goods, in areas such as the War on Terror, energy security and contagious diseases, but these should be addressed through global taxation, rather than aid, just as national public goods are funded by taxes. Decision-making power should be ceded to local institutions, fostering political autonomy, democracy and accountability, and boosting bureaucratic capacity after 25 years of failure. Local decisions may deviate from ‘correct’ policy, but harnessing local knowledge would result in better aid. We need more multilateral aid, currently only 30% of the total, which allows for better co-ordination, less costly competition, less politicisation, and lower administration costs. And instead of relying on the IMF and World Bank, with their perennial promise an African renaissance but whose formalistic policies had failed the continent, it should be delivered through the United Nations, with two bodies for humanitarian and development aid accountable to, and audited by, the General Assembly.

A questioner insisted that aid flowed not from North to South but South to North. Paul Wolfowitz has indicated that $300bn of Nigerian resources had been stolen in the last forty years, with other estimates rising to $500bn, all deposited in western banks to the benefit of western economic growth. Doctors, teachers and technicians similarly went North, to the detriment of Africa. A second questioner welcomed the idea of report cards for aid agencies and wondered why the youth, with 60-70% of Africans being under 25 years old, was not considered a key developmental group in the same way that women are. Hoffman agreed that the North gets back more than it gives, and that the aid community is segmented by interest groups, with insufficient attention paid to the young, and in particular young entrepreneurs. Kozul-Wright argued that development depends on what the local elite does. African entrepreneurs had mostly taken money out of the continent in search of greater security and returns elsewhere. Development requires an entrepreneurial class that invests in local people, with capital controls being a key part of developmental success in Southeast Asia.

A further contribution from the floor highlighted London’s role in money-laundering, and the way aid is used as an extension of foreign policy, helping countries like Israel, Egypt and Jordan rather than those in genuine need. Moreover, remittances are three times greater than aid flows, circumvent costly administration that eats up 20% of the World Bank’s budget, and would be even more effective if they attracted tax relief. Another questioner insisted that aid was a sticking plaster, but growth is not the answer either, since it takes $166 of global growth for every $1 to reach those on less than a dollar a day, rendering growth-led development an ecological impossibility. Another asked why the aid community is not regulated and made transparent in a similar way to the financial services sector.

Day agreed that untrammelled growth could have dire environmental consequences and that diaspora flows are highly effective, noting the large flows into Southeast Asia from the Gulf, Europe and elsewhere. Kozul-Wright said that China had recently set aside $100bn to address the environmental costs of its rapid expansion, and insisted that aid is different from other flows, with private investment generally pro-cyclical, and a lagging rather than a lead variable, going to where development is already happening. He also rejected the notion that financial services are properly accountable and transparent.

In reply to why the UN would be better at aid than the World Bank, Kozul-Wright said that the other institutions had already failed. The IMF and World Bank had misunderstood the factors that underpinned success in Southeast Asia, and the UN was less vulnerable to aid being used to serve donor foreign policy, and is more trusted among the world’s least developed countries. Day agreed that the developed world is responsible for much of the corruption, but that the worst excesses of the Cold War are now behind us, with democracy now making gains in Africa and elsewhere. Hoffman agreed that industry protection is important, but that it should be married to investment in education and development, as in Southeast Asia, rather than squandered, as in Latin America.

Dr Kozul-Wright's notes>>

October 11th, 2006
Do we need a Make Poverty History campaign in 2007?

Elsie Nemlin, Founder and Executive Director of Stand Up For Africa, chaired a stimulating debate between Professor Frances Stewart, Director of the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) Oxford, and Richard Bennett, Chair of Make Poverty History Campaign and Executive Director of BOND. She began by reminding the audience of Make Poverty History’s powerful ‘finger-clicking’ TV campaign, denoting the death of a child in the developing world every three seconds due to poverty.

Frances Stewart insisted that successful campaigns need a clear objective, must know how to reach it, and the goal itself must be achievable. Otherwise campaigns can be counterproductive, and to hold a Make Poverty History campaign so soon after the last one in 2005 would be like crying wolf. Instead, the objective of Make Poverty History was nebulous, as poverty is hard to measure and means different things to different people. Is it a question of money, access to health and education, or social exclusion? Do we mean relative or absolute poverty? Should the benchmark be national or international?

The Make Poverty History campaign was, she argued, too unfocused, addressing poverty by calling for aid from rich countries to rise to the longstanding target of 0.7% of GDP, demanding debt reduction, improved policies on HIV/Aids and better trade practices. She was particularly sceptical about aid, saying that six of the ten worst performing countries over the last twenty years received aid in excess of 10% of GDP, while nine out of the ten top performers received less than 1%. The success of India and China in reducing poverty owed nothing to Western policies or campaigns. Aid fails because the conditions attached to it demand economic stability over domestic priorities such as education, require import restrictions to be lifted, and push poor countries into primary products rather than industrial development. Moreover aid often bypasses governments, which should be built up rather than undermined, and claims of partnership in development programmes give developing countries no real ownership, and no real choice over the fundamentals, with the result that the basic policies remain unchanged. She agreed that EU and US subsidies on sugar and cotton should be lifted, but said such trade forced countries into a colonial division of labour. And while she welcomed debt relief, it came with conditions that undermined recipient ownership, democracy and self-determination.

Stewart said that the multiple targets of trade, aid and debt made the means of achieving them complicated. And whilst there was some progress on debt relief and HIV/Aids, trade policy was unchanged. Meanwhile the North was actively underdeveloping poor countries by participating in, or financing, wars – UK arms sales being broadly equal to the $5bn aid budget, trade restrictions, immigration controls, conditionality, corporate corruption, while standing by during the genocides of Rwanda and Darfur. Another campaign was not needed, and should in any case by more modest and more specific, focusing on achievable goals like universal immunisation, listening to what the South say they need, and encouraging consumers and citizens to pressurise companies and governments.

Richard Bennett agreed that a repeat of Make Poverty History was not needed in 2007, but that further campaigning was essential. That Make Poverty History meant different things to different people was deliberate. Yet he began by saying what Make Poverty History wasn’t – it wasn’t a fashion trend although the white armbands proved enormously popular; it wasn’t an advertising campaign or driven by celebrities, although both were used, and it was entirely distinct from the efforts of Bob Geldof and LiveAid. It focused on the three connected issues of trade justice, debt cancellation and more and better aid – better meaning without the conditionality, agreeing with Stewart on that point. They insisted to policy makers that change was needed in all three spheres, and Make Poverty History was the first time they had been brought together into a single campaign. It was a UK campaign because the UK government chaired both the G8 and the EU during 2005, but was also part of a wider global call for action. It had multi-layered messages, from the highly successful Make Poverty History slogan to detailed policy work, encouraging people to get involved by sending letters, joining e-campaigns, setting up events and lobbying MPs – the aim being to encourage more people to engage with development issues, and to deepen their engagement. Make Poverty History was a coalition of 540 organisations, covering all major religions, trades unions, pensioner groups and a myriad others, each engaging with their own membership in whatever way was most relevant. It had defined, winnable goals at the outset, whilst recognising that some would not be won but served to raise awareness, get statements from policy makers, and set down markers that could be useful in future campaigns.

In all three areas there were concrete achievements in 2005, as well as generating momentum for the future. There was a step-change in public engagement, with 8 million wearing the armbands, 25,000 attending an all-night rally in what was the largest gathering on any topic during the general election, and 8,000 people lobbied 375 MPs, more than any other single lobby in recent history. Moreover independent research shows that the higher engagement has not completely evaporated, with membership of development charities up 50% in some cases, significantly greater enrolment in development courses, and wider, deeper public support for international development. There was $48 billion of aid commitments, a commitment from the EU to double aid by 2010, less conditionality, 100% debt cancellation for 18 countries, with a further 20 to follow, and a recognition from the Africa Commission of the damage done by forced trade liberalisation. However Bennett conceded that trade talks at the World Trade Organisation had, if anything, gone backwards. Even so, independent researchers identified that Make Poverty History had been vital to achieving changes in policy even if more campaigning was needed to ensure 2005’s commitments are honoured and more progress is made.

Bennett argued that the international focus should now move to Germany, where the government will hold the chair of the G8 in 2007 and the EU presidency in the first half of the year. UK interest and media coverage was bound to reduce with the UK’s declining international prominence, and whilst it was a difficult decision to leave a campaign slogan that had 92% public recognition, it was better than facing declining media interest and a consequent loss of momentum. Yet vigorous campaigning is still needed, in conjunction with Southern partners in order to reduce the dominance of the North.

In response to a question from the audience, Bennett conceded that the campaign should have communicated better its multi-layered objectives, and highlighted its successes to the grassroots, although he pointed out that the achievement of sustained public engagement could only be determined more recently. A second questioner argued that aid and debt are peripheral issues, insisting contrary to Stewart that exports of agricultural products like sugar and cotton are a good way of generating economic activity and income, suggesting it would be another two generations before Africa could compete with Asia in manufacturing. In reply, Stewart insisted that she favoured the removal of the subsidies, but said it would be more effective to campaign on that specific issue, highlighting Jubilee 2000’s success with debt reduction. However protection of infant issues is key, or else she insisted that poor countries would be trapped in low-skilled agriculture and primary production, and subject to the vagaries of commodity prices. Bennett agreed that developing countries needed tariffs to protect infant industries, and both agreed that, short of extreme cases such as Darfur, conditionality undermined democracy in developing countries and enforced the same old policy prescriptions that had consistently failed over the last thirty years.

Benny Dembitzer, Director of the global development forum, highlighted the importance of celebrities and other spokespeople being properly informed, and identified issues such as arms sales, climate change, agricultural subsidies and migration that no amount of aid could redress. Fears of terrorism is skewing development aid, sometimes in favour of highly undesirable governments, while China is increasingly powerful and helping despotic regimes such as Sudan and Angola in order to secure oil supplies; in short, he thought that we were running ever faster to stay still. Another questioner asked how the panel would counter the perennial issue of corruption, suggesting organs like the Daily Mail raised it to impede discussion, whilst another asked how the lessons learned in Make Poverty History could be transmitted to Germany. A final question asked the panel whether they agreed with ‘Contraction and Convergence’, whereby the consumption of rich countries would fall to allow for greater consumption in the developing world, as the only solution to climate change and poverty.

While the Make Poverty History campaign focused on economic justice, Bennett insisted that this did not prevent other campaigns on issues like climate change, and discussions are underway for a joint campaign between Make Poverty History and Stop Climate Chaos in 2007. While favouring international co-operation, he stressed, that campaigns are highly culturally specific, and could not be easily translated across borders. On corruption, he highlighted the Make Poverty History campaign’s difficulties, because it was too often used as a way of deflecting debate about poverty, but instead of ignoring it they should have highlighted the involvement of western companies in corruption. Stewart agreed the central importance of climate change and Iraq, where we are complicit and can bring about change ourselves. Moreover she suggested that the focus on corruption is unhelpful and not necessarily an impediment to economic development, highlighted South Korea, the US and France as countries with significant corruption and successful economies. She also agreed with Contraction and Convergence in principle whilst saying it was not politically realistic. However a redirection of consumption, shifting in habits, behaviours and technologies towards non-carbon activities was, she agreed, essential if climate change is to be effectively addressed.

October 4th, 2006
Making the international economic institutions transparent and accountable.

Professor Peter Willetts of City University compared the transparency and accountability of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund with the extensive access allowed in the United Nations. There, some 3,000 accredited non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can participate in policy-making, distribute documentation and address the General Assembly and Security Council. He claimed the World Bank is the most open of the global economic institutions. Between 1981 and 1999, 25 of the larger NGOs gained special access through the NGO Committee, although their arbitrary selection undermined their legitimacy. Moreover in 1999, when the Bank decentralised, the larger NGOs failed to recognise the need to band together, undermined also by the new regional, rather than global, focus. With renewed impetus brought about by the Seattle protests of 1999, the Bank replaced the Bank’s NGO Committee with a Civil Society Forum, considered more inclusive through the representation of churches and trades unions. However access to the Banks various forums, from extractive industries to aids, remains ad hoc, with no automatic rights to information or access. Meanwhile the IMF has much less engagement with civil society, with access largely limited to bankers and academics, whilst at the World Trade Organisations (WTO) contacts are mostly restricted to corporations.

Willetts insisted that NGOs are self-selecting interest groups, non-democratic, and should not be confused with the ‘voice of the people’. He rejected claims made by some NGOs for a vote in our global economic institutions. However he emphasised the value of their contribution to the debate, which prevented the institutions from turning a blind eye to issues and groups, and enhancing the democratic process and improving policy-making.

Tim Cullen, a former spokesman for the World Bank, insisted that engagement with civil society preceded the protests in Seattle and Prague, and whilst representation through the NGO Committee was selective, the former President of the Bank James Wolfensohn made particular efforts. The Bank had always been more open than it was given credit for, through public information centres and, more recently, its website. Moreover Independent Evaluation Groups look into what went wrong with projects and policy, and few organisations criticise themselves so openly. The Independent Inspection Panel increased accountability, providing a mechanism for those who considerable themselves harmed by, or about to be harmed by, the Bank’s policies. Even so, Cullen conceded that the Bank should be more transparent and accountability to the many millions of people affected by its decisions. Indeed many of its 10,000 employees are pushing in that direction, and external critics should seek out internal allies.

The IMF is, according to Cullen, very different, more monolithic, and completely financed by its Board members, allowing them considerable scope to dictate policy. Shareholdings are heavily skewed towards rich countries, with Belgium, for example, holding more votes than India. Reform of the voting system is both needed and expected, although weighting votes in favour of funders is inevitable if they are to be accountable for their taxpayers’ money. Representation at the World Bank is little better, where it, too, is heavily skewed towards the G7 countries. Yet the World Bank is easier to attack, despite open access much of its research, its decentralised structure and its willingness to engage with civil society ‘in the field’. He regretted the appointment of Paul Wolfowitz, who, unlike previous Presidents, worked primarily with the shareholders on the board, rather than representing the Bank as an institution and its staff. Whereas previous presidents were wrongly accused of being US stooges, Wolfowitz is one.

Jeff Powell of the Bretton Woods Project argued that the IMF, World Bank and GATT (now the WTO) owed their structures to the colonial era and had failed to adapt. He adopted the One World Trust’s managerial and political approach to accountability, arguing that the IMF failed on both counts. The managing director was automatically a European, and there is no evaluation of performance either of the MD or the board members, whilst the influential position of Dean of the Board went automatically to the longest serving member, irrespective of ability. Publication of its minutes, beyond scant information listing those present and the subjects discussed, is delayed for ten years, down from an initial thirty. Arrangements for NGO participation were not formalised.

Powell questioned the independence of the Independent Evaluation Office and the accountability of the international financial institutions (IFIs) to member governments, with no role for those affected by their policies. There was no consultation with recipient parliamentarians, or with key ministries such as health and education whose budgets faced deep cuts. Oversight of IFIs was, he insisted, theoretical rather than effective, self-congratulatory rather than critical. Unlike the World Bank, the Fund had no Inspection Panel, and its staff even enjoyed immunity from prosecution. And the macroeconomic strategy is dictated rather than discussed by the Fund through its Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. Yet, at a time when the Fund is reforming itself, it is the weakest it has ever been. Stronger global economies mean that fewer counties are borrowing, whilst others have repaid debts early, reducing the interest income used to finance its administration. With its clients gaining a greater say, significant reform is possible, including to the selection of the president, the appointment of the board, and the possibility of a double majority in decision-making based on one dollar one vote and one country one vote. There is further pressure to publish minutes after three-to-six months, a lag sufficient to allow for candid discussion of operational matters. Then there is considerable need to empower parliamentarians in developing countries to hold IFIs to account and increase the involvement of civil society.

The panel was divided in response to a question from the floor that claimed to two greatest development successes – China and India – had thrived from their rejection of IMF and World Bank prescriptions. Powell insisted that the newly industrialised countries of Southeast Asia, the NICs, had also benefited from closed economies and their rejection of neo-liberalism. Cullen insisted that China and India were the Bank’s two largest borrowers and, like South Korea, had prospered from World Bank advice, although he acknowledged some differences, citing the example of India choosing to prioritise tertiary over primary education. Willetts said India and China had costs and benefits from being closed economies, but had made strong gains since opening up, and insisted the largest market distortions in the world economy were the ‘Stalinist’ European Common Agricultural Policy, and the farm subsidies of the United States and Japan.

However the panel was united in their dismay at the appointment of Paul Wolfowitz to the presidency of the Bank, a position in the gift of the US president, and in the need to reform the institutional structures. Willetts rejected as unrealistic a call from the floor for a global parliament to which global institutions can be accountable, highlighting that a third of seats would be Chinese and Indian, whilst the major funders would have little representation. It would be too remote, each seat representing many millions if the parliament were to be a manageable size, insisting instead that indirect democracy can be accountable. Agreeing with a questioner, Powell said that appointment to, and remit of, the Independent Evaluation groups were not independent, and they came under pressure from senior management. For example a group investigating fragile and war-torn states were not allowed to explore whether debt conditionality contributed to destabilisation. Moreover whilst he agreed that the employees were sincere in the development ambitions, their background, whilst geographically diverse, were too culturally homogenous.

In reply to a question regarding recipient corruption, Cullen highlighted the benefits of competitive bids, and said that post-operation evaluation was as independent as it could be whilst still drawing on the expertise of the Bank. He also highlighted the benefit of closed meetings, citing the tendency to rhetoric and grandstanding seen in the UN. Cullen also claimed that the Bank had taken a leading role in environmental protection, and Willetts highlighted the role of the Global Environment Facility in ensuring development programmes are environmentally sustainable. However Powell said that less than 5% of the Bank’s energy lending went to renewables, and that its clean energy investment framework including ‘clean’ coal, nuclear power and large dam projects.